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L Introduction: Ambiguities without Answers
On November 3, 2004,2 Senator John Kerry conceded the
presidential election to President George W. Bush,3 and the nation exhaled a
deep sigh of relief that this presidential election would not end in another
lengthy and contentious legal battle like the one that cast a dark cloud over
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (Chief Justice Earl Warren).
2 See Tracy Grant, Election Is Too Close to Call, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at C15 (noting that
although the election was held on November 2, 2004, the election was still too close to call at the end of
the day because of the close margins of victory in a number of key states).
3 Adam Nagourney, Bush Celebrates Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at Al.
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the 2000 presidential election.4 Although his decision to forgo litigation
helped unify a politically divided nation in the wake of a contentious election
cycle,5 Kerry also closed the door on a judicial dissection of the balloting
process and a potential opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit many of
the lingering questions from its controversial and tangled decision in Bush v.
Gore.
6
In this Note, I examine one of these lingering questions: Does Bush
v. Gore and the relevant equal protection case law open the door for an equal
protection challenge to a state's use of different voting machines/
technologies and how do the racial disparities in error rates impact this
analysis?7  As we reflect on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
4 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In Bush v. Gore, the Court evaluated the Supreme Court of
Florida's order for a manual recount "in all Florida counties where so-called 'undervotes' had not been
subject to manual tabulation." Id. at 100. The Court found that the Florida Supreme Court's order for a
manual recount of votes without establishing a standard for tabulation violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 103. The Florida Court's directive to discern the intent of the voter from the questionable
ballots rendered "unequal evaluation." Id. at 105-06. In addition, the certification of incomplete recounts
was permissible under the Florida decision. Id. at 108. Since the ballots and the Florida voter's choice for
President were not treated equally, the Florida Supreme Court decision was reversed and the mandatory
recount was stopped. Id. at 111. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE To CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX-
DAY BATTLE To DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); ALAN M. DERSHowrz, SUPREME INJUSTICE:
How THE HIGH COURT HUjACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
5 See Charles Hurt, As Night Wore On, Glee Became Gloom, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at
Al 1 (quoting Senator Kerry as stating: "In America, it is vital that every vote count .... But the outcome
should be decided by voters, not a protracted legal fight.").
6 Id. A group of prominent House Democrats strongly objected to and encouraged legal
challenges of the counting of Ohio's electoral votes in the 2004 election.; see Amy Fagan, Kerry Rebuffs
Protest of Ohio Electors, WASH. TMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A4 (discussing Kerry's decision to not join the
protest of the Ohio Electoral votes).
7 See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 469, 470 (2001) (discussing in a self-proclaimed "short essay" the "significance of the
racial disparities reflected in machine-rejected ballots"). Given developments in the case law and political
science data regarding these disparities since 2001, this issue deserves greater scrutiny.
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Education8 and the fortieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 9 it
seems particularly important to continue scrutinizing the electoral process to
ensure that all Americans are given not only equal access to the ballot but
also an opportunity to uniformly impact who is elected. Standardization of
voting technologies at the state level is central to accomplishing this goal.'0
Given the nation's current partisan political divide," the documented
closeness of recent elections at all governmental levels,' 2 and the recognition
that a single vote or a single jurisdiction's returns can impact national
8 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown ] (finding that racially
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In Brown, the
Court considered together four cases brought by African-American public school students who were
challenging the racial segregation of public schools. Id. at 487-88. The plaintiffs claimed that the
separate schools were not equal and they thereby violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 488. The
Court directly confronted the effect of the "separate but equal" doctrine on modern public education. Id.
at 492-93. The Court found that separate facilities denoted the inferiority of African-Americans and
expressly overruled such language in its prior Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). Id. at
494-95. The Court concluded that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" based on the
Equal Protection Clause and reversed the decision of the lower court that had denied the Plaintiff's request
for relief. Id. at 495.; see also, e.g., Genna Rae McNeil, Essay, Before Brown: Reflections On Historical
Context and Vision, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 1431 (2003) (discussing the background of and time period leading
up to Brown); Honorable Robert M. Bell, C.J., Ct. of Apps. of MD, Journey To Justice: Fiftieth
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2004) (recalling personal
experiences in the Civil Rights movement post-Brown); Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Multiple Ironies: Brown
at 50, 47 How. L.J. 29 (2003) (addressing the problematic premises regarding race in Brown and arguing
that Plessy's language better advances the right of African-Americans).
9 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 1973 (2000)) (enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment); see Karyn L. Bass, Are We Really Over the
Hill Yet? The Voting Rights Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement in the Wake
of Election 2000 and Bush v. Gore, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 114 (2004) (analyzing the success of
litigation and legislation in achieving the goals of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
to See Press Release, Elec. Data Serv. Inc., New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use
Electronic Voting Systems, 32 Million Still with Punch Cards in 2004, http://www.electronicdataservices.
com/EDSIncVEstudy2004.pdf. ("Over the years, several states have moved to establish uniform voting
systems. Oklahoma led the way by establishing a uniform optical scan voting system in the early 1990s.
Delaware's three counties have used electronic systems since 1996. Hawaii and Rhode Island established
uniform optical scan systems in 1998. Georgia established a uniform electronic voting system in 2002.
Nevada will establish a uniform electronic voting system in 2004; Maryland, in 2006. Although
Maryland's uniform system won't be fully implemented until 2006, all 24 election jurisdictions, including
the city of Baltimore, are expected to use some type of electronic system in 2004.").
11 Toobin, supra note 4, at 5-8. In 2000, the United States had the closest presidential election in
the modem history of the Electoral College. Id. On election night, the national news media first declared
Vice President Al Gore the winner, only to retract the prediction a few hours later. Id. Eventually,
George W. Bush was declared the winner but only after five weeks of legal debates, recounts, and
political mayhem. Id. The 2000 election was the first time in over 100 years that the candidate who won
the Electoral College and thus the presidency was not the candidate that won the popular vote. Id. The
2000 and 2004 elections also demonstrated that there is currently no overwhelming mandate for either
party's political platform.
12 See Jason B. Conn, Excerpts from the Partisan Politics of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
58 (Apr. 2003), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/conn-fvr.pdf (unpublished undergraduate honors
thesis, Cornell University) (on file with author) (discussing closing gaps in elections at federal and state
levels).
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elections, 13 the Court should strictly apply "one person, one vote" to its
jurisprudence regarding election machines. Whereas the courts have been
willing to scrutinize reapportionment plans to ensure that electoral districts
are unexceptionally even,' 4 the courts have largely looked the other way
when confronted with one of the largest threats to the ideal that every
person's vote counts equally: Errors in voting machine technology which
compromise one's vote do not strike evenly across types of voting machines,
and the error rates within a state often correlate with race and socioeconomic
status.
The Supreme Court hinted in Bush v. Gore that it wanted Congress
and the state legislatures to address the problems associated with varying
voting technology, 15 but it is time for the Supreme Court to hand down a
mandate and force each state to use the same voting technology.' 6  This
article suggests that one legacy and lesson of Brown v. Board of Education is
that giving the nation's legislatures leeway to rectify serious constitutional
inadequacies "with all deliberate speed" is a formula for failure; the courts
must mandate change. 17 In mandating standardization, the Court will protect
13 See Tim Jones & Andrew Zajac, Vote Ordeal for Ohio Begins, Ends in the Dark, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 3, 2004, at C12 (noting that one region in Ohio's vote count could ultimately decide the
2004 presidential election); see also Chris McGann, Gregoire Sworn In Amid Legal Challenge, SEATrLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 13, 2005, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local//207695.govemor
13.html (discussing the closeness of the 2004 Washington State Governor's race).
14 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Law of Democracy: Redistricting: Case Law and Consequences: Got
Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 459-61 (2004) (analyzing the "got theory" argument in the Court's
foray's into political redistricting).
15 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide
will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting.").
16 The argument in this paper focuses on standardization at the state level, as opposed to national
standardization. States have always had the power to regulate elections. Given the individualities of
elections in each state, a single type of machine might not work for every state. Because electoral districts
are apportioned based on census data and not the number of people voting, a state would not lose any
congressional seats because a higher percentage of their population was disenfranchised through machine
errors. Furthermore, because we have an Electoral College voting system, and the popular vote is
meaningless in presidential elections, disparities in error rate would not impact a state's influence on the
presidential election. In other words, many of the "one person, one vote" arguments discussed in this
paper would be cured by standardization at the state level, and there would be no extra benefits from
nationwide standardization in terms of one's statistical impact on an election. Furthermore, the nation
might benefit from varying technologies in different states because there would be an incentive for
companies to develop more accurate machinery, thus winning additional state contracts. Ideally,
machines will some day have a zero percent error rate. This day is far off, but national standardization
might not encourage the development of new technologies. Of course, these arguments all revolve around
the practical impact of one's vote and not the abstract value of having one's vote counted, thus some of
the arguments in this paper could certainly suggest that nationwide standardization is the only
constitutional system.
17 See Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1951-52 (1987) (noting that the
Court's lax implementation of the "deliberate speed" mandate was problematic); Michael A. Berch,
We've Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders from Higher to Lower Courts on American
Jurisprudence, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 493,495-96 (2004) (observing that the "all deliberate speed" language in
Brown enabled some cases regarding discriminatory practices to fall "off the radar screen" of the Courts).
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"one person, one vote" and ensure voting equality among all races.
II. Syllabus
Thus far, this Note has suggested that the quick resolution of the
2004 presidential election helped unify the nation and did not provide a
forum in which the courts could review and clarify the Supreme Court's
controversial and factionalized decision in Bush v. Gore.18 Part II examines
the current state of voting technology in the United States and argues that
statewide variation in technology is problematic in a democracy. Part IV of
this article explores, albeit briefly given the large amount of litigation in this
area, the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" standard's use as a
template for reviewing election laws and disparate treatment at the ballot
box, and argues that using voting machines with different error rates is a
violation of this standard. Part V demonstrates that the worst machines in a
state are often found in districts with a large proportion of racial minorities
and in economically disadvantaged areas, suggesting that the racial impact of
the variation should elevate the level of judicial scrutiny the use of these
machines receives. Although this article is primarily concerned with the
impact of Bush v. Gore, Part VI briefly examines the possibility of a Voting
Rights Act challenge to voting machines. Part VII examines some of the key
law suits that have been brought since Bush v. Gore challenging the use of
disparate voting machines. Part VIII draws a connection between dicta in the
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore19 and the famous "all deliberate speed"
20
order after Brown v. Board of Education,2' and suggests that despite the
expense and logistical difficulty of standardizing voting machines within a
state, the lesson of Brown I is that, when a judicial order goes to the core of
equal protection values, the Court should not give any leeway to the states to
take their time in changing policy. Part IX summarizes the arguments made
in this article and concludes by making recommendations to the Court.
II. The Problem: Variations in Voting Technology
In today's elections, voters' ability to impact elections varies
Is See Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (2000) (resolving the 2000 presidential election by a 5-4 margin with
one concurring and four dissenting opinions filed).
19 Id.
20 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that the District Courts should
proceed with "with all deliberate speed" in their implementation of Brown 1) [hereinafter Brown I].
Brown 11 remanded the cases that lay as the foundation of Brown I back to local courts in order to fashion
remedies to ensure desegregation. Id. at 299. Such remedies would be equitable in nature, fashioned to
local circumstances, and would be implemented with "all deliberate speed." Id. at 300.
21 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 483.
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depending on the type of voting machine used in their locality.22 According
to Election Data Services, which has monitored election administration for
the last twenty years, there were six broad categories of machines used by
counties in the United States during the 2004 election: punch card,23 lever,
paper ballots, optical scan, electronic and mixed equipment.24 Political
scientists and legislators have documented significant differences in error
rates for each type of machine, but voters do not choose which type of
machine they will use to vote.25 The determining factor behind which type
of machine is used within a locality is largely a combination of funding,
politics, number of voters per polling place, and the standards set by state
law.
There are a number of reasons why the intent of a voter entering a
voting booth might not be reflected in what is eventually tallied by the
election administrator and sent to state officials. Although some of these
reasons might be attributed to election fraud or mistakes by the onsite
administrator or poll workers, this article does not seek to address these
problems.26 State and federal law already deters, punishes, and seeks to
rectify the fraud associated with these types of errors.27 Rather, this article
discusses two general categories of voting frustration caused or enhanced by
voting technology: (1) errors when the voter votes, and (2) errors caused
during the counting process.
First, the type of machine impacts one's ability to overvote,
22 For a discussion of the various problems associated with different types of voting machines,
see Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d
796 (D. Ohio 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20040805_Ohio_AmicusBrief.
pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
23 Kerry might have brought a legal action in Ohio based on the use of punch card balloting had
the final vote count been slightly closer. George W. Bush received 2,859,768 votes to John F. Kerry's
2,741,167, a difference of 118,601 votes. Official Ohio 2004 Presidential Election Results,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/results2004.aspx?Section=135. Prof. Dan Tokaji found
that: "Overall, there were a total of 94,488 residual votes in Ohio's November 2004 presidential election.
Of those, the substantial majority (76,398) were cast using punch card equipment." The total residual
votes, even if completely for Kerry, would not have turned Ohio "blue." Dan Tokaji, How Did Ohio's
Voting Equipment Fare in 2004?, Feb. 8, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comment0208.html.
24 Press Release, supra note 10.
2 See generally Eric A. Fischer, CRS Report for Congress: RL30773: Voting Technologies in
the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress, http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-
55.cfm?&CFID=8946583&CFTOKEN=5583815 (last updated Mar. 21, 2001).
26 For a discussion of voting fraud in recent elections, see Lori Minnite and David Callahan,
Demos: A Network for Ideas and Action, Securing the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud, 2003,
http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/EDR_ -Securing.theVote.pdf.
27 See Disputes and Questions Linger Three Weeks After Presidential Vote: Election 2004,
SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at Al (noting that "state officials regulate elections and the Justice
Department prosecutes voting-rights violations and election fraud").
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undervote, or make an unintended choice; 28 for example:
Lever machines can prevent overvoting through the use of
interlocking mechanisms that prevent a voter from pulling a lever
for more than one candidate for a given office. Electronic systems
can prevent overvoting through an electronic equivalent of such a
mechanism. Some marksense systems can reduce overvoting by
permitting a ballot to be checked by the tabulator (sometimes
called a "smart ballot box") before submission and indicating if
there is an overvote; the voter can then be given a new ballot.29
Although there are no machines that absolutely prevent undervoting, some
machines indicate the races for which a voter has not selected a candidate,
thus providing the voter with an opportunity to correct his "mistake." These
machines, often electronic, force the voter to make a deliberate decision to
leave a section of the ballot blank.3°
Unintended choice was a large problem in the 2000 Presidential
election in Florida which was publicized largely in connection with the
infamous "Butterfly Ballot."''  Although voting machines generally cannot
warn voters about unintended choices, since these machines cannot possibly
know voters' intention, voting technology that allows voters to review their
selections prior to submission would help reduce the incidence of these
errors. In all these ways, the type of voting technology that is used greatly
28 See Fischer, supra note 25, at CRS-8 ("There are three basic kinds of error that a voter might
make: overvote, undervote, and unintended choice. An overvote is a vote for more candidates for a
particular office than is permitted, such as voting for two candidates for President, and is usually
considered an error. An overvote on a ballot item invalidates the vote for that item. An undervote is a vote
for fewer than permitted, such as voting for no candidate for President. An undervote may or may not be
an error -- a voter might, on the one hand, have tried to vote for a candidate but was unsuccessful in
marking the ballot unambiguously, or might, on the other hand, have chosen not to vote for any candidate.
An unintended choice is inadvertently voting for a candidate other than the one intended.").
29 Id.
30 Walter Mebane, The Wrong Man is President! Overvotes in the 2000 Presidential Election in
Florida, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 525, 525-28 (Sept. 2004). It is true, that even if the warn-and-
correct technology is part of the machine's package, it is still subject to human error. In Florida during
the 2000 election some election administrators did not understand the function or never turned it on.
31 See generally id. (demonstrating that undoubtedly, the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach
caused many more voters to make mistakes there); see Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1201 (11 th Cir.
2000) ("It was stated in the Palm Beach recount request that the particular configuration of the ballot in
that county (the so-called 'butterfly ballot') had confused Palm Beach's voters, producing two bad results:
a substantial number of votes were disregarded because more than one choice was punched in the
presidential race; and some voters may have inadvertently voted for someone other than their true
choice."); see generally Steven J. Mulroy, Substantial Noncompliance and Reasonable Doubt: How the
Florida Courts Got it Wrong in the Butterfly Ballot Case, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 203 (2003).
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impacts the accuracy of the manifestation of the voter's intention.32
The second broad category of error caused by machines is created by
the counting mechanism associated with each machine. This category is
arguably more problematic since the voter has often left the polling place
before her vote is tallied and the error is often attributable to a
machine/technological failure, not human error.
33
Consider an automated assembly line at an American factory. If all
of the machines operate perfectly, then a perfect product will emerge at the
end of the line. But, as is true of almost anything with an automatic function,
there is an error rate. Some miniscule percentage of products will emerge
from the assembly line with imperfections. In business, manufacturers factor
in this error rate and understand that they will have to take a loss on some
number of defective products. In vote counting, failing to tally these
"defective" votes may significantly impact a close election.
Different tabulation error rates have been associated with different
type of machines.34 For example:
In the 2000 elections, 53.4 percent of California voters used
punch-card machines, while the remainder used DRE or optical
scan technologies. The punch-card machines suffered error rates
32 After the 2000 election debacle, I purchased a voting machine that had been used by a Florida
polling site that utilized punch-card ballots, the ballots that caused the problems with "hanging chads." In
fact, I found many chads littered around the machine's packaging. After having watched months of
controversy and litigation regarding the standard that should be used to count these ballots, I was
surprised to find clear instructions attached to the inside of the machine telling voters that they must fully
punch through the card before submitting their ballot. Although there could have been additional
safeguards to ensure that voters fully punched their ballots, the voters were not without instruction or
warning if they failed to vote properly without leaving "hanging chads."
33 See Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political
Currency of Local Government, 50 BuFF. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (2002) ("The hanging chad became a
running joke, a symbol of everything that was wrong with a process that had been badly bungled and was
now running amok, and which was irretrievably corrupt. The skepticism that met the canvassing boards
was ferocious. Indeed, to many around the country-whether in favor of or against recounting, whether
Democrat or Republican-the pictures of individuals sitting at card tables in gymnasiums trying to
decipher punch-card ballots were simply not consistent with their vision of American democracy at
work."). Id. These two categories are largely intended as guideposts as this paper discusses types of
errors. It is not clear which category some errors fall into. For example, consider the "hanging chad" in
Florida. This system was problematic at the time of voting since the technology failed to allow the voter
to make a clear selection and did not warn the voter of potential errors, but it was also problematic during
counting since the counting technology did not count many ballots that would have been votes if counted
by a human.
34 See Fischer, supra note 25, at CRS- 11 ("Reports on the accuracy of different systems vary. For
example, some people have claimed that punch card readers can have an error rate as law as 1 vote out of
each 10,000 counted under ideal test conditions. Error rates as high as I in 100 have been reported from
prior elections, and some experts believe that votomatic punch card systems using pres-scored card may
be the least accurate of the available technologies"); see generally The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
Project, Residual Votes Attributable to Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting
Equipment (Mar. 30, 2001), http://www.hss.caltech.edu/-voting/CalTech_MT_ReportVersion2.pdf.
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of 2.2 percent, more than twice that of the other technologies.
Thus, for every 10,000 votes cast in a punch-card county,
approximately 200 were discarded; in the other counties, fewer
than 100 were lost to machine error.
35
Furthermore, a state's decision to tabulate the votes at the precinct or
county level further impacts the number of errors.36  Indeed, given the
closeness of today's elections, "the difference between the numbers of votes
cast for the two leading candidates may be less than the error rates in the
balloting and vote counting processes and machinery."37 The wide variation
in voting machines forces us to reassess what type of "equality" we want
when it comes to the electoral process.
A. Unstandardization
Currently there are six main types of voting technologies being
utilized throughout the United States.38 Each type of machine is associated
with a certain error rate, and the error rates vary significantly. Certainly in
law, we accept a certain level of error in our proceedings and standards. For
example, in criminal cases, our standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable
doubt." This is not absolute certainty, and we recognize that it is not a
perfect system. 39 Indeed, rarely in law do we find ourselves facing absolute
certainty about any standard that is applied. 40 However, we hope that our
judicial standards are applied equally across race, socioeconomic factors, and
jurisdiction.
In the case of voting machines and the error rates the court accepts,
there is not standardization. Even across precincts within a locality, there
may be very different machines and procedures when one arrives at the polls.
Analytically, the very fact that voting machines vary significantly seems
particularly troubling to our notion of equality and "one person, one vote."
After all, equal access and the ability to impact an election is the very basis
35 Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 409,436 (2002).
36 See Brian Kim, Recent Development: Help America Vote Act, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 586
(2003) ("[P]recinct tabulation allows voters to correct the ballot if they have not completed it properly.
Without precinct tabulation, voters do not know whether their ballots will be read by the scanner. By the
time the ballot is transported to a central tabulation center, it is too late for voters to correct their ballots if
they are rejected by the scanner."); Mebane, supra note 30, at 6.
37 Joseph W. Little, Essay: Election Disputes and the Constitutional Right to Vote, 13 J. LAw &
PUB. POL'Y 37 (2001).
38 See Table 1, infra pp. 49-50 (outlining the six types of voting machines).
39 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Warns About Test for Reasonable Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1994, at B8.
40 See generally Richard D. Friedman, EvIDENCE 39-42 (3d 2004).
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of the Supreme Court's continuous review of election laws and voting
procedures through the lens of the 14th Amendment's equal protection
clause.4'
B. Standing: Defining the Injury
Thus far, this article has demonstrated that certain voters have a
greater likelihood that their vote will not count as a result of the voting
machines they use when they arrive at the polls. This article lays out a
constitutional challenge to the variation in voting machines, and a challenge
cannot go forward without establishing standing.42 It is therefore important
to more specifically define the injury.43 As the Supreme Court has noted:
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"
-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of, the injury has
to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not the result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely
"speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision."44
No voter can know for sure whether or not his or her vote was
counted; anonymity remains an essential part of the electoral process. Thus,
after an election, no voter could argue that his or her individual vote had not
41 See New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693 (1989) (noting "[e]lectoral
systems should strive to make each citizen's portion equal").
42 For discussion of standing in voting rights litigation, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2276 (1998); Judith
Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court's
View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein,
Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996).
43 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding The Right To An Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv.
1663 (2001) (discussing the tension in the caselaw between "the highly individualistic view of rights
developed by the Rehnquist Court and the group-based conception of harm evident in many other areas
of the law").
" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
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been counted as a result of a machine malfunction.45 But if the standard was
proving individual harm to a certainty, almost no vote dilution case could go
forward: A voter in a precinct where the pollworkers threw away all but one
ballot when the polls closed would have no redress in the courts under this
narrow conception of standing. The courts have dealt directly with this
issue:
Because the voting process is anonymous, it is impossible for any
one voter to know with more certainty that their intended votes
were not counted. If standing in cases like this one required more,
then no one would have standing to challenge a system with, for
example, a 20% or 30% or 60% residual vote rate, or a policy
under which every tenth ballot was systematically discarded
instead of counted. Such results would be contrary to both voting
rights and standing law. Further, the injury here alleged, is not the
State's failure to count any one person's vote, but the higher
probability of that vote not being counted as a result of the voting
systems used, i.e., vote dilution. That injury is both provable and
traceable.... Vote dilution as "directly related to voting, the most
basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific
(citation omitted).,
46
Indeed, the probabilistic injury, which has been demonstrated throughout this
part of the article, is enough to establish standing, as is consistent with court
decisions in other areas of the law.47
This article repeatedly revisits and refines this description of the
injury, but many courts have found the probabilistic injury sufficient for the
purpose of establishing standing under Article 11.48 Of course, even with
45 Some defendants in cases challenging voting mechanisms have even suggested that the case
should be dismissed on account of "mootness" because the case was either brought before an injury could
be shown or after the injury had occurred and the election could not be undone. These arguments have
been rejected. See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (refusing
to dismiss the case "on the issue of mootness"); Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding that the claim was properly considered even though the litigation was filed one month after the
election in question had occurred).
46 Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (N.D. III. 2002) (citation omitted).
47 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 61 n.10 (1976) ("Clearly there is no
difference for purposes of Art. III standing-personal interest sufficient for concrete adverseness-
between a small but certain injury and a harm of a larger magnitude discounted by some probability of its
nonoccurrence. If the probability of the more ultimate harm is so small as to make the claim clearly
frivolous, the plaintiff can be hastened from the court by summary judgment."); McGuffage, 209 F. Supp.
2d at 895 (citing Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) and finding that voters had standing to bring a
challenge to the use of different voting mechanisms based on a probabilistic injury).
48 See, e.g., McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 895 ("[Pllaintiffs have standing to raise the claims
asserted."); Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (acknowledging the strength of the defendant's argument, but
declining "the invitation to dismiss the case on standing").
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standardization, there would still be a chance a vote would not be counted,
since no machine has a 0% error rate. However, the injury asserted here, in
the equal protection sense, is really the relative probabilistic chance that
one's vote will not count in comparison with other voters in the same state.
This is a definable injury with a remedial solution, and because there is a
definable injury and a remedial fix, the question that remains is whether the
courts can mandate this fix using the Fourteenth Amendment or Voting
Rights Act.
IV. "One Person, One Vote"
Throughout the last fifty years, the courts have routinely stepped in
when fundamental voting rights have been impeded. Election law is largely
left up to the states, but according to the Supreme Court:
"[w]hen a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state
interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such
insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." The
conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing - one person, one vote.
4 9
The "one person, one vote" standard is discussed throughout legal
scholarship and has become a mainstream maxim when it comes to election
policy. 50 However, the words "one person, one vote" do not appear in
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,5' the section the Supreme Court has
relied upon in formulating its "one person, one vote" standard, and its
strictness in application and scope are not always clear. The application of
the "one person, one vote" standard has evolved, and a better understanding
of its development will facilitate this article's discussion of how a legal
challenge to variations in voting machines could fit into the "one person, one
vote" jurisprudence.
49 Gray, 372 U.S. at 381 (citing Gomillion v. Ughtfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
50 Robin Wright, President Hails Election As a Success and a Signal, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2005, at At. When American and Iraqi leaders recently developed election policy for Iraqi elections,
many analysts and even Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani argued that in order for the election to be fair, it must
operate on a one person, one vote system. Id. This demonstrates how universally recognized the
American "one person, one vote" principle has become.
51 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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A. Entering the "Political Thicket"
Historically, the federal courts stayed away from issues they
perceived as political in nature and were reluctant to review issues related to
elections for fear of impeding on local autonomy. 2 However, the laissez
faire period in the Court's elections law jurisprudence has long passed.53
Today, the courts decide many issues related to the election and rarely shy
away from reviewing the electoral process.54  Using equal protection
analysis, the Court has said that States cannot treat voters differently in three
respects: (1) Right to cast a vote; (2) Right to an equally-weighted vote; (3)
Right to have vote counted.55 However, the Court is constantly refining and
expanding the amorphous "right to vote,, 56 and "history has seen a
continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country."57
Recognizing that "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice
is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government," the Court seeks to attain
greater equality in all aspects of the electoral process.58
B. The Impossibility of "Absolute Equality" is not an Impediment
However, while striving to achieve greater equality in the electoral
process, the courts have been reluctant to require "absolute equality" when
conducting their equal protection analysis.59 In the reapportionment line of
equal protection cases, the Supreme Court recognized that despite even the
most genuine efforts to create equality between electoral districts, other
factors would create some level of inequality. For example, in Karcher v.
Daggett,6° the Court found that "[a]ny standard, including absolute equality,
52 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (providing a number of justifications for the
judiciary staying out of political apportionment questions).
53 See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (providing an example of the Court's recent reviews of election
law issues).
5 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("When contending parties invoke the
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.").
55 Camp, supra note 35, at 418.
56 Id.
57 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
58 Id.
59 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (J. White dissenting) (stating that "...by
extending Kirkpatrick to deviations below even the 1% level, the redistricting plan in every State with
more than a single Representative is rendered vulnerable to after-the-fact attack by anyone with a
complaint and a calculator").
60 See generally id. at 725. In Karcher, the Court considered the validity of New Jersey's plan to
reapportion congressional districts based on the 1980 census data which reduced the representatives of the
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involves a certain artificiality.... [E]ven the census data are not perfect, and
the well-known restlessness of the American people means that population
counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are
completed. ''6 1  Applying this reasoning to voting machines, one might
conclude that the Court would be willing to allow a certain level of
inequality when it comes to error rates, and that we should just accept that
there are a number of factors that are uncontrollable. However, as the Court
recognized in Karcher, the distinction between apportionment inequality
made by the legislature and imperfections in census data is that the latter
"apply equally to any population-based standard we could choose., 62
As one court recently noted:
Neither the federal courts, nor likely anyone, can guarantee to
every eligible voter in this country a perfect election with 100%
accuracy. The courts can, however, by enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, guarantee the equal treatment of voters who attempt to have
their votes counted, their voices heard.63
The error rates made during machine vote counting line up with the
apportionment inequality in Karcher, which the Court found unacceptable
because the errors are tolerated by the state and do not strike evenly across
jurisdictions. The Court recognizes that in all elections there are certain
uncontrollable factors that lead to "inequality," but the controllable ones that
do not "apply equally" across a population must be weeded out through
legislative changes and judicial review. Disparate voting technology is one
such controllable problem.
state from 15 to 14. Id. at 727. The plan adopted by New Jersey established districts with varying
population sizes and the court found that these variations could have been minimized by good faith efforts
to promote equality amongst the districts. Id. at 728-34. The Court found that New Jersey failed to
establish that each variance was necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective. Id. at 740-42. The
Karcher court held that New Jersey's plan to reapportion congressional districts violated 1, §2 of the
federal Constitution, because New Jersey did not make a good faith effort to minimize population
variances among the districts and could not justify each variance as necessary to achieve a legitimate state
objective. Id. at 744.
61 Id. at 732.
62 Id.
63 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889, 891.
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C. Having One's Vote Count as a Fundamental Right
"The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the right to
vote is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. '64  If
voting is a fundamental right, then it would seem that having one's vote
count equally is a natural extension of this right, and thus triggers strict
scrutiny. In Gray v. Sanders,65 the Court used the 15th Amendment rather
than the 14th Amendment66 to specifically link the right to cast a vote with
the right to have one's vote counted:
The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters
have a constitutionally protected right to cast their ballots and have
them counted at Congressional elections. Every voter's vote is
entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and
reported. The right to have one's vote counted has the same
dignity as the right to put a ballot in a box. It can be protected from
the diluting effect of illegal ballots. And these rights must be
recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the
true weight a vote will have.
67
This linkage between the casting and counting of a vote is consistent with a
long line of court decisions.68
Bush v. Gore also addressed this connection:
64 Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Common
Cause 1]; see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (discussing the "close constitutional scrutiny"
for voting restrictions).
65 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that the use of a county unit voting
system in a statewide election violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In
Gray, the Court considered whether a state statute creating a county unit system whose practical effect
was to make the vote of each citizen count for less and less as the population of his or her county
increased was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 376.
The Court was unwilling to draw the parallels made by the district court between the Electoral College
used for federal elections and the county unit system used in this statewide election. Id. at 378. States can
specify the qualifications of voters as long as those qualification do not discriminate against one class or
group, but the Equal Protection Clause does not allow the State to weigh one person's vote more than
another. Id. at 379. Political equality, noted the Court, dictates that one person equals one vote. Id. at
381. 66 See id. at 376 (noting that "this case... does not involve a question of the degree to which the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature").
67 Id. at 380.
68 See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) ("[T]he right to have one's vote
counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box."); see also United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) ("Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the
Constitution, is the right to qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at
Congressional elections. This Court has consistently held that this is a right secured by the
Constitution.").
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First, Bush establishes that state action regarding vote-counting is
fully subject to the equality principles it perceives inherent in the
right to vote. Second, Bush expands upon existing doctrine in
defining those principles. The opinion finds an equal protection
violation in unequal treatment despite the absence of any discrete
and articulable voter "classification" (arguably the pith of the
Court's voting rights doctrine prior to Bush), ignores whether
uneven treatment is intentional in assessing whether the Equal
Protection Clause is violated, and employs an elevated standard of
review in assessing purported justifications for any uneven
treatment. The extension of evolutionary equality norms to the
context of vote-counting, combined with a heightened standard of
inquiry into purported justifications, represents the essential equal
protection "rule" of Bush.69
The fundamental right that must be protected according to Bush v. Gore is
the right to an equal valuation of one's vote at all stages of the voting
process: "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State
may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote
over that of another. 
70
One of the challenges made in Bush v. Gore was whether disparate
manual counting methods without uniformity violated the Equal Protection
Clause.7' Similarly, a challenge to the variation of voting machines would
hinge on whether machines with different counting methods without
uniformity violate the Equal Protection Clause. If one equates human vote
counters with voting machines, the legal challenges look basically identical.
Although one might question whether the Bush rule "actually applies to the
mechanics of vote-counting or whether it is limited to systemic concerns
such as methods of election and districting ... Bush v. Gore seems to invite
this analogy. 72 Thus, it would appear from the language in Bush that the use
of different voting machines may violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Whether states can fashion a sufficiently compelling justification for
continuing to use varied technologies is one of the "important questions of
Equal Protection and the right to vote that Bush v. Gore now opens up.
'" 73
69 Camp, supra note 35, at 416-17.
70 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
71 See generally Bush, 531 U.S. at 98.
72 See Mulroy, supra note 31, at 221-23 (discussing the statistical evidence that butterfly ballots
were not counted properly in at least one Florida county and making the further claim that this possible
mechanical error creates a reasonable doubt as to the veracity of victory).
73 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF Er AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 306-07 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
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D. Bush v. Gore Applies to Machines
Some scholars have suggested, quite persuasively, that Bush v. Gore
applies only to the "expressive harm" caused by the public and poorly-
managed recount in Florida.74 Arguably, the expressive harm caused by
perceptions of illegitimacy due to the widespread publication of stories about
faulty machines, and the reality that when minorities go to the polls to vote
they are more likely to see these faulty machines, is just as large as the
"expressive harm" discussed in Bush. At the time of the holding, it is
possible that the Court was less focused on the voting machinery than it was
on the laughable manual recount process. However, most scholars and
courts have argued that Bush v. Gore applies to vote counting processes more
generally, and that even if it was not intended, the language of Bush is
applicable generally to voting standards and technologies, not just the
specific expressive harm caused by the Florida recounts:
[The Supreme Court] has asserted a new constitutional
requirement: to avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters. And
this obligation obviously cannot be limited to the recount process
alone. The court condemns the fact that 'standards for accepting or
rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to
county but indeed within a single county.' That criticism surely
would apply to the variations in voting machines across Florida,
and, for that matter, to similar variations in all other states. The
court's new standard may create a more robust constitutional
examination of voting practices.75
Bush was about vote counting procedures and inequality. The varied use of
the Bush decision in the last four years demonstrates that there is no general
consensus on the applicability of Bush to voting machines. But beyond its
general limiting language, almost nothing in the opinion suggests that it
cannot be extended to vote counting mechanisms generally.76
Only Justice Souter writing in dissent advances justifications for
the distinction between recounting and balloting that seem, if not
persuasive, at least arguable. Souter suggests that local variety in
74 See Gerken, supra note 43, at 1692 (using the redrawing of district lines to describe
"expressive harm" as harm resulting from a district's actual shape after its borders have been redrawn as
opposed to "representational" harm, which results from a representative's acts directed at the new
population within the redrawn district).
75 Samuel Issacharoff, The Court's Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39.
76 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL, supra note 73, at 309; see infra notes 165-207 and
accompanying text (discussing the subsequent use of Bush v. Gore in the courts).
RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE
balloting technology is justified by "concerns about cost, the
potential value of innovation, and so on," a claim that echoes the
much less explicit reference by the majority to "local expertise.
77
Certainly, without any explicit and convincing argument that that the
language in Bush cannot be applied to voting machines, the courts should,
and have, broadly interpreted its application:
What is missing from the opinion is an explanation of why the
situation in the case is distinctive, and hence to be treated
differently from countless apparently similar situations involving
equal protection problems. The effort to cabin the outcome,
without a sense of the principle to justify the cabining, gives the
opinion an unprincipled cast.7
This conclusion will be unpacked further in Part VII.
E. Bush's Limiting Language
In Bush v. Gore, the Court limited the precedential value of the
decision by noting that "[the Court's] consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities. 0 9  The Court reasoned that its
decision should be limited because of the "many complexities" of equal
protection analysis.80 Even if one does not believe that Bush's precedential
value is limited, perhaps the Court would be willing to cite its decision in
Bush v. Gore in the context of voting machines since the challenges to
different counting procedures and different counting machines are so
similar.81  At least one court has already reasoned that the answer is that
77 Camp, supra note 35, at 441.
78 Cass R. Sunstein, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CH1. L. REv. 737, 765 (2001).
79 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see generally William C. Smith, Bush vs. Gore: Evermore: Plaintiffs
Use High Court Voting Case in Other Lawsuits, ABA JOURNAL, 87 A.B.A.J. 16 (May 2001), available at
http://www.pawalaw.com/assets/abajoumal article.pdf.
80 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see Smith, supra note 79 (stating that "the High Court seemed to be
expecting a one-hit wonder").
81 See Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy In The Wake of The California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
239, 267 (2004) (arguing that "Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's prediction that Bush v. Gore was a 'one of a
kind case' was premature (or perhaps wishful thinking)").
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Bush v. Gore can, and should, be cited in this context.
82
Bush stands as more than just a fact-specific result, more than a
meaningless judicial coin-toss. Seven of nine Supreme Court
Justices concurred on the equal protection holding, and if the Court
insists on saying something is so, then it is so. What the majority
said, precisely, was explained in a nearly 4,000 word, twelve-page
per curiam opinion - an opinion by which it and all other courts
ostensibly are now bound in interpreting the Constitution. Such a
pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court can not
flippantly be ignored. Moreover, widespread public approval of
the Bush decision may do more to assure its long-term legitimacy
than will the firmness of its doctrinal footing.83
F. Level of Scrutiny: A Severe Infringement on the Right to Vote
As is true in any Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the court must
determine what level of scrutiny should be applied during review. For
example, classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny,84
classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny, s5 and those
classifications which affect fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. 6
Although I will consider the impact that race may have on a potential
82 See McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898 ("Although the [Bush v. Gore] Court limited its
decision to the then present circumstances, the rationale behind the decision provides much guidance to
the situation in this case, which presents, as far as this Court can tell, a matter of first impression in this
Circuit and, indeed, this country. That question is whether a state may allow the use of different types of
voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy, or if such a system violates equal
protection.") (internal citations omitted). Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d
882, 895 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying on Bush v. Gore), vacated by 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
83 Camp, supra note 35, at 411 (internal citations omitted).
84 See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
85 See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
86 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (utilizing strict scrutiny in its
analysis).
RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE
challenge later in this article, in the wake of Washington v. Davis,8 7 disparate
impact alone on racial minorities is not enough to trigger strict scrutiny
without intent under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, any argument that
strict scrutiny should apply would probably have to be grounded in a
fundamental rights line of reasoning.
The Court has been somewhat ambiguous as to the level of scrutiny
that should apply when examining potential violations of the fundamental
right to vote. Certainly, Bush has confused many constitutional scholars and
lower courts that have looked to see what level of scrutiny was applied by
the Court. This is discussed further in Part VII.
88
Although Bush appears to address the fundamentality of the right to
have one's vote counted, s9 if the Court truly treated its opinion in Bush as
unprecedential, then under the pre-Bush jurisprudence courts could still
apply strict scrutiny. In Burdick v. Takushi, a 1992 case, the Court outlined
the balancing of interests that it considered in determining whether to apply
strict scrutiny in the election law context:
Under this standard [of weighing the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury against the constitutional rights sought to be
vindicated,] the rigorousness of the Court's inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which
a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Thus, when those rights are subjected to "severe"
restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a
"state interest of compelling importance." But when a state
election law provision imposes only "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, "the state's important regulatory
87 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that a "[d]isproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations."). In Washington, a
written personnel test for potential police officers which had disproportionate effects upon black
applicants was challenged under the Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. Id. at
233. The Supreme Court held that the test did not violate either the Fifth Amendment or analogous
sections of state and federal law, observing that the test in question was facially neutral and served the
legitimate governmental purpose of ensuring a well-qualified police force. Id. at 246.; see also Johnson
v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("Of course, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
a state from using a facially neutral law to intentionally discriminate on the basis of race."). But see
Camp, supra note 35, at 425 ("By ignoring the emergence of intent-based review, Bush wipes away
another potential objection by clearly implying that intent is not a requirement for an equal protection
violation in the vote-counting context.").
88 See infra notes 165-207 and accompanying text (discussing the implications and use of Bush
v. Gore).
89 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (referring to voting as a "fundamental right").
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interests are generally sufficient to justify" the restrictions.
9 °
This methodology suggests that if the restriction is not "severe" enough,
heightened review, or the requirement of a "compelling importance," do not
apply.91 In the pre-Bush jurisprudence a challenge to disparities in voting
machines would probably include a discussion of the severity of the harm
caused by the variation.92 However, any notion that the burden on the right
to vote is not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny is strongly rebutted by
evidence demonstrating the large disparities that error rates and variation of
technology have on individuals and communities with less accurate
technology.9 3
G. Fatal in this Case: Application of Strict Scrutiny
Although strict scrutiny does not invalidate all laws, 94 absent a
showing of a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored, a law will be
deemed unconstitutional.9 5  Unlike earlier voting rights cases where the
Court was forced to consider strong arguments from the State with regard to
the compelling purpose of a law being challenged, most of the arguments for
maintaining dissimilar voting technology are grounded in the practicality of
replacing the voting machines. States have made a number of procedural and
constitutional arguments against the application of heightened review, based
on a lack of standing, and even based on the absence of "invidious intent,"
but if the court was at the point of applying strict scrutiny, the laws allowing
disparate technologies would almost definitely be struck down.96 In the face
90 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal citations omitted). In Burdick, the
Court considered whether Hawaii's ban on write-in voting impermissibly violated an individual's rights of
expression and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 430. The Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny because subjecting every voting regulation to such a high standard of review would
"tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently." Id. at 433.
The Court described the three different mechanisms available to an individual who wished to appear on
the election ballot and concluded that the system provided for adequate access to the ballot. Id. at
435-36. Because the burden the Hawaii law imposed upon voters was slight, the State did not have to
show a compelling interest in order to prove the law's constitutionality. Id. at 439. The State's interest in
running an efficient election that did not allow for "divisive sore-loser candidacies" was sufficient. Id. at
439. Consequently, the Burdick Court held that the State's legitimate interest in prohibiting write-ins
outweighed the limited burden placed upon individual voters. Id. at 440.
91 Id.
92 See id. (applying a flexible standard that weighs severity of harm against State interests).
93 See id. (stating that "when those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must
be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance") (emphasis added).
94 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (reminding the parties that "strict scrutiny is
not strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
95 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1151 (2005).
96 See McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (considering the main arguments that states make in
support of upholding their statutes).
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of a fixable infringement, the Court should apply heightened review and
force compliance.
97
H. The Counter-Arguments: Cost and Local Autonomy
Even though a fundamental right is implicated, the costs of
instituting standardization would be unprecedented in elections
administration and cannot be ignored in any considerations of
98standardization. With the current budgetary problems facing state
governments and the growing federal deficit, many political leaders would
probably argue that American tax dollars could be spent better elsewhere. 99
Although this argument might suggest that the courts need to order
standardization, since Congress and the legislatures will not, it is also a
somewhat convincing justification for a gradual move to better, and more
standardized, voting technology, rather than a complete overhaul prior to the
next election cycle. 100  This may ultimately rest on a public policy
consideration by the Court, but given that the election is the focal point of
American democracy, "replacing voting systems that deprive individuals of
the right to vote is clearly in the public interest."' 0 '
As was described above, election administration has traditionally
been left to local autonomy. 0 2 Thus, if Congress or the courts entered the
"thicket" of voting mechanisms, one might argue that they had overstepped
the powers of the federal government. 0 3  However, this argument seems
extremely unlikely. If there is one lesson from Bush v. Gore, it is that the
federal courts will not hesitate to get involved in elections and any exit from
97 See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1470 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
(finding that in the face of a racial dilution constitutional violation "the selection of a plan with seven,
rather than five, single-member districts reflects a conservative remedy limited to only those measures
necessary to cure the violation.").
98 Sunstein, Bush v. Gore, supra note 78, at 765.
99 Id.
1o See infra notes 208-34 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court's experiences in Brown
I and Brown H indicate that any Court ordered plan for the vindication of a fundamental right should have
an enforcement mechanism, rather than being left to individual states to implement at their own pace); see
also Jason Belmont Conn, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the Legislatures, 10
MICH. J. RACE & L. 495 (2005) (discussing the differences in the approaches that state legislatures and
courts take when addressing election law issues).
101 Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2002) [hereinafter Common
Cause 11] (finding that the only question was the feasibility of replacing the machines before the next
election).
102 Sunstein, Bush v. Gore, supra note 78, at 766 (considering the implications of Bush v. Gore on
"longstanding rules of local autonomy") (stating only two techniques looked at by the Article hold out any
hope of disentangling the Supreme Court from the political thicket).
103 See generally id.
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the "political thicket" would be difficult for the courts at this point.'
4
Certainly, there is no reason to believe the courts would restrain from
involvement in a challenge to voting machines, when they have become so
deeply involved in the enforcement of equality in elections. 10 5
In summation, using the "one person, one vote" standard and
applying strict scrutiny, the courts should strike down any state law that does
not require equal error rates in the voting machines it uses. The disparity in
voting machines is altering the likelihood that a vote will be counted, thus
violating that voter's fundamental right to vote without a compelling
justification for doing so.' °6 This is consistent with other cases implicating a
fundamental right,'0 7 and with previous cases where voting was found to be a
fundamental right.
0 8
At least one court has already suggested, even if strict scrutiny is not
the standard, under any standard of review, the use of disparate voting
machines would be unconstitutional:
Even if the more lenient standard is ultimately applied by this
Court, Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the Secretary of
State's permission to counties to adopt either punch-card voting
procedures or more reliable voting procedures is unreasonable and
discriminatory.' °9
After all, in the face of a blatant inequality, the two most proffered reasons
for maintaining the disparity in machines, cost and local autonomy, seem
104 See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B. U. L. REv. 667, 698 (2002) (stating that only two
techniques looked at by the Article hold out any hope of disentangling the Supreme Court from the
political thicket).
105 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing the federal courts' entrance into the
realm of politics, abandoning their laissezfaire position).
16 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 109 (referring to voting as a "fundamental right").
107 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (stating that the right to marital
privacy and to marry are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected
by the Constitution).
'08 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62 ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) ("the political franchise of voting as a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights"); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see also Duke v. Massey, 87
F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that "when a state election law burdens a fundamental
constitutional right severely, that law may survive only if it satisfies strict scrutiny"). But see Common
Cause 1, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 ("The Supreme Court, however, has not clearly articulated the level of
scrutiny which courts are to give to alleged infringements of the fundamental right to vote."). See also
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 ("Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any
burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold.").
109 Common Cause 1, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
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insufficient.
V. The Problem Revisited: Where the Worst Machines are
Found and an Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
Although it remains unclear whether the Court would accept a
"mathematical equality," 10 "one person, one vote," or fundamental rights
argument as justification for requiring the standardization of voting
technology, the addition of a race-based argument would significantly
increase the pressure on the Court under the 14th Amendment."' After all,
when a system has a "greater negative impact on groups defined by
traditionally suspect criteria, there is cause for serious concern."'"12 There is
significant evidence that the lack of standardized voting technology has a
disparate impact on urban and minority communities. 13  This Part of the
article demonstrates this impact and examines the effect it should have on a
legal challenge."4
As new voting technology reaches the market, wealthy jurisdictions
pride themselves on providing it to their voters, 1 5 but the poorer
neighborhoods end up with the old, and less accurate, voting machines that
"1 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258 (1962) (stating that most, but not all, do not contend that
mathematical equality among voters is required by the Equal Protection Clause). But see Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 566 ("We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical
quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection;
our oath and our office require no less of us.").
M See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (searching for evidence that Blacks "had
less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice"); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker,
J., concurring) (finding "that the decision should be rested not on the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather on
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution").
112 McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
113 Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial
Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 46 (2003); MINORITY STAFF OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
DIV., COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 107TH CONG., INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNDERCOUNT
N THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (July 2001) [hereinafter SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS]; John Mintz &
Dan Keating, A Racial Gap in Voided Vote: Precinct Analysis Finds Stark Inequity in Polling Problems,
WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
114 It is interesting that efforts to introduce internet voting have met substantial resistance from
civil rights activists who question the impact that internet voting will have on different communities,
given the differences in access to the internet based on the economic, and thus racial, makeup of particular
constituencies. However, these same concerns do not appear in the mainstream press regarding the
differences in access to traditional voting technologies. See Kristen E. Larson, Cast Your Ballot.com:
Fulfill Your Civic Duty Over The Internet, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1797, 1804 (2001) (finding that
some of the litigation in this area "arose from the idea that poor and minority voters do not have equal
access to Internet voting systems, because they do not have computers or Internet access at home or
work").
115 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2435-36 (1994)
(suggesting that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment "did believe that caste or class legislation was
forbidden; but they did not fully unpack the category" and that they thought it was a "small subset of
legislation, involving illegitimate grounds for differential treatment").
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the wealthier neighborhoods pass down. As one journalist aptly noted,
"votes don't spoil because they're left out of the fridge. It comes down to the
machines. Just as poor people get the crap schools and crap hospitals, they
get the crap voting machines."' 1 6 Due to the fact that the worst machines and
technologies are employed in poorer jurisdictions and inner cities where
voting technology upgrades are not a high budgetary priority, the lack of an
upgrade hinders, in a statistically significant way, the effectiveness of the
urban, and thus minority, vote. 1 7 Classes of voters who should be "similarly
situated" are not being treated similarly."
18
A. Congressional Findings
After the 2000 election, Rep. Roybal-Allard requested the first report
at the national level to investigate race and income's connection to the
number of undercounted and uncounted votes in the 2000 election." 9 The
investigation examined forty congressional districts in twenty states; twenty
of the districts had high poverty rates and a large minority population, twenty
had low poverty rates and a small minority population.120  The report made
three significant findings: (1) Voters in low-income, high-minority districts
were significantly more likely to have their votes discarded than voters in
affluent, low-minority districts; (2) Better voting technology significantly
reduced uncounted votes in low-income, high minority districts; and (3)
Better voting technology significantly narrowed the disparity in uncounted
votes between low-income, high-minority districts and affluent, low-minority
districts.' 2  Essentially, voters in low-income and high-minority districts had
worse machines and these machines caused more minority votes to be
discarded. 22
The findings of the report are consistent with other studies of
116 Greg Palast, An Election Spoiled Rotten, BALT. CHRON. & SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2004, http://
balimorechronicle.com/1 10204Palast.shtml.
"7 Income and Racial Disparities in the Undercount in the 2000 Presidential Election, supra note
113; Mintz & Keating, supra note 113.
118 See generally, Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 115 (discussing the development
of the equal protection doctrine to mean that "similarly situated" Americans must be treated "similarly"
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
119 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 113, at 2.
120 See id. at 3 (stating that in order to create the sample of congressional districts, "information
was obtained from the Congressional Research Service" and the districts were selected based on the 1990
census data; districts were not selected if their boundaries had changed prior to the 2000 election).
121 Id. at i.
122 See id. at 9 (stating that districts with high poverty rates and a high minority population has
significantly higher rates of uncounted ballots and that uncounted ballots were reduced by 85% when
improved voting technology was used).
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elections. 123  In a recent study of the racial gap in voting errors, Tomz and
Van Houweling found that "the black-white gap in voided ballots depends
crucially on the voting equipment that people use." 124 They found that the
use of DRE and lever machines cut the gap in the voting errors by a factor of
ten. 125  Although they found that the machines were not the only factor in
differences in error rates, citing African-Americans' propensity to
intentionally undervote at a higher rate than Whites, they found that when
machines were standardized, the gap was between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage
points,126 suggesting that standardization would basically eliminate any racial
differences. Thus, standardization would be one of the easiest fixes to a
serious state-supported racial disparity in American history.
B. Fundamental Right .+ Race = Heightened Strict Scrutiny?
The studies are enlightening and arguably unsurprising, but the
current widespread consensus in political science that voting machines dilute
the minority vote suggests a breach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. The racial impact of a system that uses a variety of machines
is now certainly foreseeable. 127 Indeed, although it is unlikely that intent on
the part of the legislatures could be shown, 28 the combination of a
fundamental right and race suggests that an extremely high level of scrutiny
should be applied.
The Court has historically separated its analysis of classifications
and fundamental rights as two separate strands of equal protection. 29 When
a fundamental right is implicated, however, a classification in effect, not
123 See Mebane, supra note 30, at 526 (finding "[i]t is well established that throughout Florida
voting problems disproportionately affected blacks and Democrats"); Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf,
Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-Level Analysis 2 (May 2001)
http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfrmlinvalidv.pdf (finding "counties with more African Americans and
Hispanics have higher rates of invalidated ballots" and discussing similar election studies); see also
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (finding the variation is "impacting African American and Hispanic
groups disproportionately").
124 Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 113, at 58.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Cf. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 511 n.17 (1979) ("To add the word
'foreseeable' does not change the analysis, because the police department in Davis would be hard pressed
to say that the disparate impact of the examination was unforeseeable.").
128 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that a "[d]isproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations").
129 See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 55 (finding that disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to
establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution).
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necessarily intent, could be enough to further heighten the level of review.
30
The use of the levels of scrutiny is formulaic, but in application, the levels
are extremely abstract and open to interpretation as to how they should be
applied. When considering race and voting laws the Court should be
immediately suspect of any laws that have a large disparate impact on a
"discrete and insular" group's ability to access the political process.1
31
VI. A Potential Challenge Under the Voting Rights Act
Although this analysis of the constitutionality of the variation of
voting machines focuses on the implications of Bush v. Gore, which does not
focus on the Voting Rights Act, 32 any analysis of the intersection of
elections and race would be incomplete without a discussion of the Voting
Rights Act's impact on a constitutional challenge. 33  After all, the Voting
Rights Act was enacted to "ensure that minority voters no longer will have to
raise their voices against judicial tyranny,"'134 and was the most important
legislation passed by Congress during the Civil Rights Era. President
Lyndon Baines Johnson called the Act "one of the most monumental laws in
the entire history of American freedom."'135 Despite lofty descriptions of the
Voting Rights Act, the Act's applicability to the unintentional disparate
impact on protected minorities created by a statewide variation of voting
machines is not unequivocal, and may reach beyond the scope of Congress'
130 See id. at 113-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause,
if a classification 'impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, . . . strict judicial scrutiny' is required, regardless of whether the infringement was
intentional. As I will explain, our cases recognize a fundamental right to equal electoral participation that
encompasses protection against vote dilution. Proof of discriminatory purpose is, therefore, not required
to support a claim of vote dilution. The plurality's erroneous conclusion to the contrary is the result of a
failure to recognize the central distinction between White v. Regester and Washington v. Davis: the former
involved an infringement of a constitutionally protected right, while the latter dealt with a claim of
racially discriminatory distribution of an interest to which no citizen has a constitutional entitlement.")
(citations omitted).
131 See United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (considering
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition).
132 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (establishing up front that "[t]he petition presents the following
questions: whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential
election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to
comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses").
133 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 306-11 (asking "[i]s there also a role for
courts in policing voting technologies, both before and after Bush v. Gore?").
13 James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2
of The Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 611 (1999).
135 Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered
(Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 793 (2001-02) (quoting David J Garrow,
Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, at 132 (1978)).
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enforcement powers. 136 However, as is argued in this Part, the Voting Rights
Act should be "interpreted in a manner that provides the broadest possible
scope" and should be used by the courts to standardize voting machines.
1 37
A. Scope of Congress' Enforcement Powers
Under the Reconstruction Amendments
The scope of Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments has been heavily litigated over the last decade
with respect to the Voting Rights Act. 138  "[T]he Supreme Court has
instructed ... that statutes should not be construed to alter the constitutional
balance between the states and the federal government unless Congress
makes its intent to do so unmistakably clear." 139 Indeed, because there is no
explicit standard for determining whether an application of the Voting Rights
Act would extend beyond the scope of congressional power:
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.
Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer
be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]." While the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and
Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a
connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction,
136 Essentially, the applicability of the Voting Rights Act to this type of challenge could be framed
by asking the question: If Congress passed a bill to standardize voting technology at the state level, or
even at the federal level, would this action be beyond the scope of Congress' powers?
137 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
138 See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions have looked at the scope of the enforcement powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) ("States have broad
powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised. The gist of the
matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. When a State
exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review.
But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a
federally protected right.").
139 Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 104.
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one apparent from the text of the Amendment."14
The scope of the Voting Rights Act is often ambiguous. As a result, the
Circuits have been divided in some important areas of election law.
14 1
Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act, under its
enforcement powers, to eliminate discriminatory practices based on race.
142
As the Supreme Court stated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach:1
43
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the
blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century. The
Act creates stringent new remedies for voting discrimination
where it persists on a pervasive scale, and in addition the statute
strengthens existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination
elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the power to
prescribe these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by
"appropriate" measures the constitutional prohibition against racial
discrimination in voting.'44
Due to the fact that many states continued to enact discriminatory practices
under the auspices of neutrality with respect to race, "[i]n 1982, Congress
amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to make clear that certain practices
and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote are
forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects
them from constitutional challenge." 145 Thus, the 1982 amendments relieved
140 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (stating that Congress' power to
enforce is only preventive or remedial and that it cannot enforce a constitutional right by changing the
nature of the right).
141 See Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d at 1214 (finding that whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
applies to felon disenfranchisement provisions has divided the Circuits); e.g., cf., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at
102 (deciding that § 2 did not reach New York's felon disenfranchisement statute) with Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding that § 2 applied to Washington's felon
disenfranchisement law).
142 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308; see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28
(2003) ("Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.").
143 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301. In Katzenbach, South Carolina challenged selected provisions of
the Voting Rights Act as violations of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 307. The Supreme Court held that
Congress, operating under the § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, may use any rational means it deems
appropriate to ensure the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Id. at 324. These means include
the prohibition of literacy tests and other voting tests, poll taxes, and Federal preclearance for voting
regulations and political subdivisions. Id. at 315, 316.
144 Id. at 308.
145 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 383-84; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (discussing denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color through voting qualifications or prerequisites).
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"plaintiffs of the burden of proving discriminatory intent,"' 4 even though a
plurality of the Supreme Court had held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that the
Voting Rights Act and Fifteenth Amendment had an intent/purpose
requirement. 147 However, even as amended, "Section 2 does not prohibit all
voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect,"' 148 and
just because intent does not need to be shown, does not mean that disparate
impact alone is always enough. 1
49
Today, it certainly appears that a "state practice could survive Equal
Protection Clause scrutiny but fail Section 2 Voting Rights Act scrutiny."' 50
Thus, it is an attractive platform for challenging the use of different machines
should the equal protection argument fail.
B. A Voting Rights Act Challenge: Why now?
As we approach the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the most obvious question raised by
the possibility of a challenge to disparate voting machines is: Why now?
The courts have been particularly skeptical as to whether a challenge falls
outside the scope of congressional intent when the challenged practice was in
place at the time of the Voting Rights Act's enactment, no specific mention
of the practice was made at the time of enactment, and no challenge was
brought immediately after the Act was passed. 15' After all, the use of
different voting machines has been commonplace over the last century - if
this practice was in violation of the Voting Rights Act, then why have not
more challenges been brought? There are two answers to this question:
146 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403.
147 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile held city-wide elections for all city
council positions and a group of minority citizens challenged this practice as a violation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Fourteenth amendment, and the Fifteenth amendment, favoring election of a
mayor by the entire city and of city council members on a district basis. Id. at 58. The Court interpreted
the statutory claim as identical to the Fifteenth amendment challenge and found that the evidence failed to
show intent to discriminate as required by the Court; likewise, the success of the Fourteenth amendment
claim hinged on purposeful or intentional discrimination, also unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 61,
62-63, 65-66.
149 Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d at 1228; see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 383 (stating that "certain
practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote are forbidden").
149 The vote dilution cases that used the Zimmer factors were not looking for outright intent, but
they were looking for something more than just a disparate impact when looking at the Zimmer factors
and the totality of the circumstances. This suggests that the Court's history indicates there might be a
need to show something more than disparate impact. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1973) (setting forth factors to be considered in determining whether a voter districting scheme is
constitutional).
150 Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d at 1234.
151 Id. at 1229 (discussing the role that the Voting Rights Act should play in the court's review of
felon disenfranchisement laws in Florida, since construing the Act to invalidate felon disenfranchisement
laws might be "clearly contrary to Congressional intent").
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First, the Voting Rights Act has been used before to challenge problems with
voting technology, but the cases have usually garnered little attention and
been focused on a small geographic area. 52 Second, many of the problems
now associated with voting technology have come to light since the 2000
election and with advancements in technology. 153  Of cdurse, these two
answers are not unconnected; ironically, challenges to voting technology
under the Voting Rights Act could not succeed on a large-scale until the
technology and modeling were in place to properly review and understand
the deficiencies of the system.154  Now that the courts can "identify and
remedy the burdens," a challenge under the Voting Rights Act is more likely
to succeed.
155
C. Anatomy of a Challenge To Disparate Voting
Technology Under the Voting Rights Act
"The essence of a [claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C.S. § 1973] is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives."' 156  When scrutinizing a voting practice, courts generally
look to the "non-exclusive list of factors relevant to a claim under § 2" which
was codified in the Voting Rights Act:
[T]he history of official voting-related discrimination in the
political subdivision; the extent to which voting is racially
polarized; the extent to which the political subdivision has used
152 See, e.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989) (using the Voting Rights Act to
challenge problems with voting technology).
'5 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL, supra note 73, at 311 (noting that previous litigation under
the Voting Rights Act had focused on rules for aggregating votes, showing a general lack of awareness
regarding problems with voting technology); see generally Part I: "The Problem: Variations In Voting
Technology," infra pp. 6.
154 Even though this conclusion may seem ironic, it is not unlike what has occurred in recent
gerrymandering cases. As technology for finding inequality has emerged, the standards have gotten more
stringent. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Technology is both a threat and a
promise. On the one hand, if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan gerrymandering, the
temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional manner will grow. On the other
hand, these new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the precise
nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of voters and parties. That
would facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the
derived standards.").
155 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that courts must have a standard
to measure the burden imposed upon a claimant's representational rights in order to more effectively
decide gerrymandering cases).
156 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see Wamser, 679 F. Supp. at 1529 (looking at
whether the punch card voting system denies blacks an equal opportunity for participation in St. Louis).
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electoral practices that tend to enhance the opportunity for
discrimination; whether minorities have been excluded from any
candidate slating process; the extent to which minority groups bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health; the extent to which political campaigns
have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the
extent to which minority members have been elected to public
office; whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of minority
groups; whether the policy underlying the use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous. 1
57
A plaintiff must show that there is a disparate impact on minority voters, but
a disparate impact alone, is not enough. In order to challenge a voting
practice under "Section 2[,] plaintiffs must show a causal connection
between the challenged voting practice and the prohibited discriminatory
result." 158 In cases where the "causal connection" is glaring, the court does
not need to pay as much attention to the codified factors, as is consistent with
Congressional intent that "intent" not be a factor in Voting Rights Act
inquiries:' 59 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
emphasized ... that this list of factors was not a mandatory seven-
pronged test; the list was only meant as a guide to illustrate some
of the variables that should be considered by the court. As stated in
the Report, 'there is no requirement that any particular number of
factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the
other. '60
Thus, any suggestion that a challenge to disparate voting mechanisms does
not fit perfectly into the Act's "factors" is rebutted by the strong "causal
connection" that can be shown using the vast amount of data on the disparate
impact.
As this article described above, political scientists have demonstrated
that minorities are disproportionately affected by the disparities in voting
machines, and that in any given election minority voters are having their
157 Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306,
309-10 (3d Cir. 1994); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (noting that "this list of typical factors is neither
comprehensive nor exclusive").
1'8 Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 312; see Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1117-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing
Ortiz and discussing the different Circuits' treatment of this "causal connection" inquiry).
159 See Farrakhan, 359 F.3d 1116 (denying petitioner's request for a rehearing en banc).
160 Gomez v. Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988).
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votes discounted at a much higher rate than white voters. 161 Thus, a finding
of disparate impact is certainly supported. 62  There is also a "causal
connection" between the use of disparate voting technologies and the
disproportionate discounting of minority votes. Minority voters have their
votes discounted disproportionately because they disproportionately reside in
precincts using the worst machinery;' 63 were the machines standardized, the
disparate impact would disappear.
No one could blame the machines for the geographical polarization
that has led to the disparate impact in discounted votes. After all, geographic
homogeneity is the result of centuries of discriminatory social, economic,
governmental, private, and political practices that are deeply connected with
the history of racial bigotry in the United States. But because the use of
different machinery by geography "interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality," the practice violates the Voting Rights
Act.
164
VII. Subsequent Use of Bush v. Gore in the Courts
In the four years between Bush v. Gore and the 2004 election, 165 a
number of suits challenging voting practices and the adequacy of voting
machines were filed in state and federal courts.' 66 Although many of these
suits are quoted in this article and the arguments presented in this article
reflect their contributions to the caselaw, a few of these decisions are more
explicitly discussed in this section. As is true of many of the Court's
161 Perhaps one of the advantages of bringing this claim under the Equal Protection Clause, as
opposed to the Voting Rights Act, is that in more homogeneous states a claim under the Voting Rights
Act might fail. Without a racial disparate impact, the Voting Rights Act claim would likely be dismissed
on the pleadings.
'(
2 See "The Problem Revisited: Where the Worst Machines are Found and an Argument for
Heightened Scrutiny," infra pp. 24-27 (discussing empirical studies that show racial disparities in
different types of voting machines).
163 There is also some very undeveloped political and social science data suggesting that certain
machines even disproportionately impact Black voters when there is standardization because Blacks tend
to undervote/overvote by accident at a slightly greater rate than Whites when the machinery is held
constant. Although this paper has not sought to answer what possible changes should be made beyond
standardization, and standardization would help remedy the overall discrepancy greatly, this area of
research's applicability to a judicial challenge should be explored further in the future. See Michael
Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, supra note 113 (suggesting that the choice of voting equipment has a
potentially significant impact on the racial disparity reflected in voided ballots).
I (4 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
165 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
166 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (finding that "[iun the wake of the 2000 presidential election,
several suits, including the present action, were filed challenging the use of punch card ballots as violative
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and/or the Due Process Clause.").
"Additionally, voters filed suits leading up to the 2004 presidential election challenging the adequacy of
the voting systems that replaced the punch card ballots." Id.
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decisions based on elections and voting rights law, the lower courts have
struggled to apply Bush v. Gore's amorphous language, 167 but as this Part
demonstrates, their reliance on Bush in examining voting mechanisms is
significant in itself.
A. Black v. McGuffage
In Black v. McGuffage, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio scrutinized a motion to dismiss, in a suit seeking an injunction
challenging the use of punch card ballots and the variation of voting systems
at the county level. The court examined "whether a state may allow the use
of different types of voting equipment with substantially different levels of
accuracy, or if such a system violates equal protection."1 68  The plaintiffs,
who were "Latino and African American voters in counties throughout
Illinois," alleged that minorities were "disproportionately forced to use-and
are disproportionately injured when they use-the challenged voting
systems. ' 169  Although the litigation did not come to a conclusion in the
courts because the suit was settled after the motion to dismiss failed, the
District Court's discussion of the motion is revealing. 170
The court denied the defendants' motion with respect to the claims
under the Voting Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process
Clause, and only dismissed the count based on the privileges and immunities
clause.' 71 Quoting Bush v. Gore, and analogizing to the human ballot
counting in Florida, the court found:
That people in different counties have significantly different
167 See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 ("Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18 years,
succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate.").
168 Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898 (N.D. 111. 2002). In Black, the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois considered the validity of the voting systems in Illinois to determine
whether the use of different voting equipments would violate voters' equal protection rights. Id. at 898.
The court reasoned that this case was similar to Bush v. Gore in that the lack of a rational basis for
implementing a different system of vote counting resulted in vote dilution. Id. at 899. Therefore, the
court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim against the defendants for violation of equal
protection. Id. Moreover, the court stated that defendants violated plaintiffs' substantive due process
rights by allowing significantly inaccurate systems of vote counting to be imposed upon some portions of
the electorate and not others without any rational basis. Id. at 901. Lastly, the court dismissed the claim
of Eleventh Amendment's immunity, because the county clerks were not state officials and thus not
protected by the Eleventh Amendment's immunity when engaged in the supervision of elections. Id. at
902.
169 Id. at 891.
170 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800 n.8 (noting that Black v. McGuffage "was subsequently
settled by the parties").
171 See McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (dismissing the privileges and immunities claim, but
denying defendant's motions to dismiss the Voting Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process
Clause claims).
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probabilities of having their votes counted, solely because of the
nature of the system used in their jurisdiction is the heart of the
problem. Whether the counter is a human being looking for
hanging chads in a recount, or a machine trying to read ballots in a
first count, the lack of a uniform standard of voting results in
voters being treated arbitrarily in the likelihood of their votes
being counted. The State, through the selection and allowance of
voting systems with greatly varying accuracy rates "value[s] one
person's vote over that of another," even if it does not know the
faces of those people whose votes get valued less. This system
does not afford the "equal dignity owed to each voter." When the
allegedly arbitrary system also results in a greater negative impact
on groups defined by traditionally suspect criteria, there is cause
for serious concern.
72
Not only did the court treat Bush v. Gore as precedential, but it also
found that the harm in Bush went beyond an expressive harm and directly
implicated the use of varying voting technology that creates different
probabilities that one's vote would be counted. The court explicitly found
that by demonstrating a "disproportionate risk of having their votes not
counted" the plaintiffs had established an injury and thus had standing.
1 73
Furthermore, the court found that because this probabilistic injury impacted
traditionally protected groups, the injury was constitutionally problematic.
Thus, Black v. McGuffage strongly suggests that Bush can be used to
challenge the use of disparate voting technology under a number of
constitutional provisions.
B. Common Cause Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Jones
In Common Cause v. Jones, the court denied the state's motion for
judgment on the pleadings after the plaintiffs challenged California's use of
the less reliable punch card ballots under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Voting Rights Act. t 7 4 In looking at the Fourteenth Amendment challenge in
Jones, the court looked at previous decisions by the Supreme Court to try to
172 Id. at 899 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 431 U.S. at 104-05).
173 Id. at 894 ("Probabilistic injury is enough injury in fact to confer standing in the undemanding
U.S. CONST. art. III sense.").
174 Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp.2d 1106 (C.D. Cal 2002). In Common Cause, the court
considered whether the Secretary of State of California's approval of the use of unreliable punch-card
systems in some counties infringed on the fundamental right to vote protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1107. The plaintiffs alleged that voters in counties with punch-card systems were
substantially less likely to have their votes counted, and that the residents of these counties were more
likely to be minorities. Id. at 1107-08. The court found that the plaintiff was not required to satisfy the
three part test set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), as this test only applies to
redistricting and vote dilution cases. Id. at 1 110.
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determine the correct level of scrutiny to apply. Ignoring the Court's
instruction that Bush should not hold precedential weight, the District Court
found significance in the Supreme Court's citation of Harper in Bush
because that opinion adopted a "standard of at least intermediate, and
possible, strict scrutiny."'175 In looking at Bush, the court was unsure which
level of scrutiny the Court had applied and found "that perhaps the Court was
using a heightened standard of scrutiny but also was finding the Florida
recounts to be arbitrary and discriminatory."'176  Thus, based partially on
Bush, the court found that the plaintiffs "alleged facts indicating that the
Secretary of State's permission to counties to adopt either punch-card voting
procedures or more reliable voting procedures is unreasonable and
discriminatory."'177 The Fourteenth Amendment challenge was allowed to
proceed.
With regard to the Voting Rights Act challenge, the state argued that
because the claim did not fit the Gingles factors, it should be denied.'
78
However, the court rejected this argument, finding that the Gingles factors
"apply to redistricting and vote dilution cases" and that a challenge based on
the disparate impact of voting machines is more analogous to a voting
qualifications challenge and thus the test outlined in Gingles does not
apply. 79  The court was convinced that the arguments under the Voting
Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment claims should proceed.
Unfortunately, "[tihe issues in this case were subsequently rendered
moot because the Secretary decertified punch card ballots" for use in
elections occurring after March 2004.180 However, due to the campaign to
recall Governor Gray Davis in the summer of 2003, the battle over
California's voting mechanisms was anything but moot.
C. Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley
In Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, would not allow a preliminary injunction
based on the California's use of different voting mechanisms in the
175 Common Cause 1, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
667 (1966).
176 Common Cause 1, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
17 Id.
178 Id. at 1110 ("[Tlhe three part test articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles: 1) the minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in single-member district; 2) the
minority group is politically cohesive; and 3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate").
179 Id.
190 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 800 n. 10.
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upcoming gubernatorial recall election of 2003.181 A circuit panel, relying
heavily on Bush, had previously found that the election should be postponed
because the "choice between holding a hurried, constitutionally infirm
election and one held a short time later that assures voters that the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are
satisfied is clear."182  The plaintiffs based their challenge on the equal
protection clause and the Voting Rights Act, and a circuit panel noted that
they were likely to succeed on the "merits of their equal protection
claims.'
183
The Ninth Circuit quoted Bush and held that because the question in
Bush did not implicate "whether local entities, in the exercise of their
expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections," an
injunction was not appropriate because the plaintiffs had not shown that there
was a high likelihood of success that their challenge would ultimately
succeed.184  After all, in determining whether to impose an injunction, the
standard of review requires that the court speculate as to the likelihood that
the plaintiffs will ultimately succeed in their action. 185 However, the Ninth
Circuit did not say that there was not a constitutional violation, 186 nor that
181 Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(per curiam). In Shelley, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to California's "punch-card" voting
procedures as constituted during the gubernatorial recall election resting on the Equal Protection Clause
and the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 916-17. The Ninth Circuit heard and agreed with arguments presented
en banc urging that it uphold the district court's denial of the injunction which would reverse the decision
of the panel of the circuit, employing a test requiring a plaintiff to show "(1) a strong likelihood of success
on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs if relief is not granted, (3) a balance
of hardships favoring the plaintiffis], and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)." Id. at
917-18 (quoting Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)). The
court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request for injunctive relief
brought by voter organizations alleging that punch-card balloting machines violated their rights protected
by the Equal Protection Clause and by the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 919-20.
182 Shelley, 344 F.3d at 912.
183 Id. at 907.
18 Id. at 918 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000)).
185 See id. at 917-18 (finding that "[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate where plaintiff's
demonstrate 'either: 1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2)
that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in their
favor. The district court must also consider whether the public interest favors issuance of the injunction.
This alternative test for injunctive relief has also been formulated as follows: a plaintiff is required to
establish: 1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to
plaintiffs if preliminary relief is not granted, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiffs, and 4)
advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). This analysis creates a continuum: the less certain
the district court is of the likelihood of success on the merits, the more plaintiffs must convince the district
court that the public interest and balance of hardships tip in their favor"') (citing Clear Channel Outdoor
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal citation omitted).
186 Id. at 919 (finding "[tihere is no doubt that the right to vote is fundamental, but a federal court
cannot lightly interfere with or enjoin a state election. The decision to enjoin an impending election is so
serious that the United States Supreme Court has allowed elections to go forward even in the face of an
undisputed constitutional violation" and citing Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113, 115 (1971)); Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 396 U.S. 1055 (1970); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967) (per curiam).
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machinery was not implicated in Bush, but solely "that plaintiffs will suffer
no hardship that outweighs the stake of the State of California and its citizens
in having this election go forward as planned and as required by the
California Constitution."'' 8 7 In other words, in the face of potential competing
constitutional interests, the Ninth Circuit erred on the side of allowing the
election to proceed. 88 The decision certainly did not foreclose future
challenges to the use of disparate voting technologies; in fact, the court hints
that if the evidence of disparate impact had been further developed at the
time of litigation, a Voting Rights Act claim might have succeeded, 189 and
that Bush leaves open the question of whether an equal protection challenge
to the use of the machines would succeed. 90
D. Weber v. Shelley
In another case in the Ninth Circuit, Weber v. Shelley,' 9' the plaintiff
argued that a "lack of a voter-verified paper trail in the Sequoia Voting
Systems AVC Edge Touchscreen Voting System that [Riverside] county
installed violate[d] her rights to equal protection and due process" because
that system was more prone to fraud.192 In rejecting the plaintiffs argument
the Ninth Circuit applied a low level of scrutiny because their use was
nondiscriminatory and had only a minor impact on the right to vote. Quoting
Burdick, the court found:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the ... Fourteenth Amendment [] that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the
187 Id. at 920.
1'8 Id. at 919 (stating that "[ijf the recall election scheduled for October 7, 2003, is enjoined, it is
certain that the state of California and its citizens will suffer material hardship by virtue of the enormous
resources already invested in reliance on the election's proceeding on the announced date").
189 Id. at 918-19 ("There is significant dispute in the record, however, as to the degree and
significance of the disparity. Thus, although plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success on the merits,
we cannot say that at this stage they have shown a strong likelihood.").190 Id. at 918.
191 Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003). In Weber, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a computerized touchscreen voting system adopted by Riverside County, California, violated a
voter's equal protection and due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because of the lack of a voter-
verified paper trail. Id at 1102-03. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that excluded expert
testimony, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude studies without a showing that experts
normally rely upon them. Id. at 1105. In addition, the court found that the expert testimonies provided by
Weber did not indicate that the touchscreen voting system was "inherently less accurate, or produces a
vote count that is inherently less verifiable, than other systems." Id. The Ninth Circuit held that a
touchscreen voting system that did not use paper does not create a severe restriction on the right to vote.
Id. 192 Id. at 1103.
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State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking
into consideration the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.
Under this standard, the rigorousness of [the court's] inquiry into
the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Thus, as [the court has] recognized, when those rights are
subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But
when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the.. .Fourteenth Amendment
rights of voters, the State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. 1
93
Weber can be distinguished from the type of challenge recommended
in this article in two ways: First, no racial disparate impact was shown. The
analysis in this article has suggested that when race is implicated the
standard of review should be heightened and the protections under the
Voting Rights Act can be triggered. Second, Weber was a challenge based
on the possibility of fraud, not on the possibility that a vote would not be
counted. As was discussed above, there are already laws in place to deal
with and deter fraud, thus the justification for standardization in this case was
much weaker than the race-based challenge developed in this article.
E. Stewart v. Blackwell
In Stewart v. Blackwell, the District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio considered a challenge that was more comparable to the one
suggested in this article. 194 A group of plaintiffs, which included African-
American voters, challenged the use of punch card voting and "central-
count" optical scanning devices under the Due Process Clause, Equal
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act. 195 After reviewing the post-
Bush caselaw, the court determined that rational basis review should be
applied, and that the "primary thrust of this litigation is an attempt to
federalize elections by judicial rule or fiat via the invitation to this Court to
declare a certain voting technology unconstitutional and then fashion a
remedy. This Court declines the invitation."'' 96 Indeed, in the Blackwell
decision the court "declines the invitation" for some extremely foolish
193 Id. at 1106.
194 Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
195 Id. at 795.
196 Id. at 804-05 n.19.
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reasons, and the decision reads like a long excuse.
First, the court denied the Voting Rights Act claim because the
plaintiffs only asserted a "vote denial" claim and neglected to assert a "vote
dilution" claim.197 While implying that the vote dilution claim might have
succeeded, the court dismisses any potential for success under the Voting
Rights Act because the plaintiffs failed to define their challenge using the
proper legal term.198 The court quickly notes that there certainly is no vote
denial because minorities have not been denied access to the polls.' 99 This
seems like an excuse so that the court did not have to consider what was
obviously meant to be a vote dilution claim.
Second, the court finds "that the operation of different voting
systems by different counties within the same state does not amount to a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. ',200 In making this finding, the
court cites Bush v. Gore, but cites Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, not the
majority. °1 It seems strange that the court would rely so heavily on the
dissenting opinion of a case that was not even supposed to have precedential
value.
Finally, in assessing where race fits into the challenge, the court
considered a variety of conflicting social science studies and concluded that
"the highest frequency in Ohio of residual voting bears a direct relationship
to economic and educational factors," not race.2°2 However, the court fails to
recognize that even though race did not match up perfectly with the numbers
on residual votes, the strong correlation between race and economic/
educational factors suggests that race is implicated by the studies. Racial
inequality, facilitated by economic/educational inequality, is exactly the type
of social and historical inequality that the Voting Rights Act was meant to
address. The court selected the study that would make it easiest to decline
the invitation and then applied an extremely narrow interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act.203
197 Id. at 807-08 (finding "[tihere are two separate and distinct theories under which a plaintiff
can assert a claim under the Act, vote denial and vote dilution") (citing Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994)).
198 Id. at 809.
199 Id. at 808.
200 Id.
201 Id. (citing Bush, 531 U.S. at 134) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
202 Id. at 805.
203 But see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403 (finding Voting Rights Act should be "interpreted in a manner
that provides 'the broadest possible scope"') (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567
(1969)).
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F. Conclusions Drawn from Litigation after Bush v. Gore
This small survey of the cases that have most closely considered the
arguments presented in this article provides little guidance as to how the
Supreme Court would come out were it to examine the constitutionality of
the variation in voting technology. 2°4 Because these types of cases are
politically motivated and are either settled or dismissed without an
opportunity for appeal prior to the certification of the next election, they have
not been litigated to their fullest potential.20 5 However, there is one very
significant common thread throughout these cases: Each of these cases cites
and relies heavily on Bush v. Gore and each court believes that Bush applies
to voting machines in some fashion. Even if this survey of cases does not
convincingly support an interpretation of Bush in favor of standardization, it
certainly suggests that the Supreme Court needs to revisit its confusing
analysis in Bush, because any prior expectation that the lower courts will not
look for meaning in its language has been shattered at this point. Any desire
that the language of Bush v. Gore be limited to the 2000 election or any
specific type of voting rights challenge seems to have been overridden by the
large amount of litigation in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore in all areas of
election law. As the Dean of Stanford Law, Kathleen Sullivan, stated "[Bush
v. Gore was] an invitation to lawyers across the country to bring an
avalanche of lawsuits claiming that [counting] people's votes differently and
with different rates of error in different counties violates the equal protection
clause."20 6 Many scholars believe that the lasting legacy of Bush v. Gore will
be its "reinvigoration" of voting rights law:
The lasting significance of Bush v. Gore is likely to be the
reinvigoration of the line of cases from the 1960s that deemed
voting a fundamental right. The court's language has now opened
the door for constitutional challenges of flawed election methods.
The spotlight on Florida revealed just how infirm the operations of
elections are. The legacy of this case could be a substantial jolt of
justice into the voting arena.20 7
2W See Smith, supra note 78 (detailing some of the initial challenges to voting machines
immediately after the 2000 election that arose out of Bush v. Gore).
205 See Garrett, supra note 80, at 265-73 (discussing the use of lawsuits as "political weapons").
206 Smith, supra note 78.
207 Samuel Issacharoff, The Court's Legacy for Voting Rights, supra note 75, at A39.
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VIII. Bush, Brown and Lessons Learned from 'All Deliberate Speed"
Part VIII presents two significant parallels between Brown v. Board
of Education and Bush v. Gore that are not explored in the literature
discussing these two landmark decisions.20 8 First, in both cases, the Court
was forced to review two separate systems that seemed facially equal with
regard to the broad purposes of the systems, getting an education and placing
a vote, when in reality the impact of the systems seriously infringed upon the
ends of that purpose. Second, in each case, the Court recognized state action
as unconstitutional, but provided weak language that created little impetus
for change. These two parallels are considered here because the Court has an
opportunity to learn from its mistakes in Brown, in remedying the
constitutional problems associated with voting technology presented in this
article. Although this article does not attempt to rehash the long and
complicated history of school desegregation/integration, °2 9 the lessons of
Brown and school desegregation should not be ignored, lest the judicial
system repeat its mistakes.
A. Background on Brown v. Board of Education
In 1954, the Court handed down what scholars consider the most
important civil rights decision in American history,210 Brown v. Board of
Education.211  Brown decided a collection of challenges to school
segregation based on race. Relying on strong social science data, the Court
found that although the schools had similar buildings, curricula,
qualifications, and teacher salaries, the doctrine of "separate but equal" had
no place in the public school system:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
208 In making the comparisons between voting rights and education, it is worth noting that some
courts have been reluctant to "extend the education line of cases to other areas," especially when there is
specific precedent in the area of law. See Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d at 1214 (discussing the Eleventh
Circuit's reluctance to extend the standards in the education cases to felon disenfranchisement laws since
"there is specific precedent from this court and the Supreme Court dealing with criminal
disenfranchisement").
209 For this type of discussion, see James L. Hunt, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty Years:
Context and Synopsis, 52 MERCER L. REV. 549 (2001); Karl A. Cole-Frieman, A Retrospective of Brown
v. Board of Education: The Ghosts of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka, Kansas: A Case Study on the Role
of the Federal Courts in School Desegregation, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1996).
210 See Christopher P. Banks, Symposium Article: The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 440 (2003) (finding that Brown I is
"arguably [the Court's] most important civil rights ruling").
211 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
212
The Court would eventually extend its reasoning in Brown to other areas of
segregation, and the unanimous decision in Brown would change the nation.
B. Separate but Unequal
Although not exactly state-sanctioned segregation of the kind that
existed in the public schools before Brown, the variation in voting
technology today is similar. Recognizing that neighborhoods in America
today are still extremely segregated, a parallel could be made between the
school system of the first half of the 20th century and voting machines today.
Looking at the broad entitlement implicated in Brown, the states
argued that there was an equal right to receiving an education. Furthermore,
they were able to demonstrate that if the doctrine of "separate but equal"
manifested itself in the educational system correctly, the tangible outcome of
receiving a quality public school education would result. Similarly, in the
case of voting, all voting technology provides an opportunity to cast one's
vote in the broadest sense. One can cast a vote no matter what machine is
used, and, if the machinery works perfectly, there is really no difference
between machines. However, the problem is that separate is inherently
unequal because the chance of failure, whether in an education system or
voting machine, is not equal once there is a separation. This is the takeaway
from Brown.
Unlike school segregation cases, where the Court had to look to
social science data in order to find qualities "incapable of objective
measurement" that were being provided unequally by the segregated
schools,213 in the case of voting machines, social science has provided
conclusive evidence that machines are creating inequality in voting. On
tangible factors alone, inequality can be demonstrated. Combining this with
the large body of literature demonstrating the somewhat intangible effect of
minority vote dilution on political influence, it is easy to see how the current
system of voting machines is inherently unequal.
212 Id. at 494.
213 Id. at 493 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
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C. Lessons from 'All Deliberate Speed,
214
In Brown, the Court overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine
215
which had buttressed segregated schools throughout the United States, and
without providing a decree for immediate desegregation, left it to the lower
courts and state government to implement the process. 216  However, the
Southern states did little to implement the Court's changes, the courts
refused to strengthen the decision without further guidance from the
Supreme Court, and ultimately "stagnation resulted., 2 17 As a result, Brown
returned to the Supreme Court in 1955 for the Court to decide how its first
decision should be implemented. Faced with unwilling state governments
and a divided nation, the Court wrote in Brown II that the States, through the
enforcement of the District Courts, must desegregate with "all deliberate
speed.
, 218
A few years later, in Cooper v. Aaron,219 after the Governor and the
legislature of Arkansas defied the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I, the
Court affirmed its authority, and forced Arkansas' schools to desegregate.
However, the decision in Cooper and the subsequent history of school
desegregation are testaments to the failure of the "all deliberate speed"
"order" from the Court. Indeed, ten years after Brown I, "few schools were
even marginally integrated., 220  It was not until Green v. County School
214 Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301.
2W5 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (announcing the "separate but equal" doctrine).
26 Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495 ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,
we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
227 Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District Courts and the
Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L. REV. 471, 471 (1999) (finding
that "[s]outhem opposition to desegregation, combined with a lack of direction from the Supreme Court,
had left the lower federal courts unwilling, or unable, to demand rapid action. Stagnation resulted.").
28 See Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301 (ordering the district courts to "take such proceedings and enter
such orders and decrees... as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties in these cases.").
219 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper, the Supreme Court considered the validity of
a court-ordered stay of the Little Rock District School Board's desegregation program due to the staunch
opposition that Arkansas state officials and the public presented. Id. at 4, 9. The Court reasoned that "law
and order are not.., to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights." Id.
The School Board, as an agent of the State, could not postpone desegregation without violating black
students' equal protection rights. Id. at 17. The State was prohibited from delaying integration by direct
or indirect action. Id. The Court noted that its interpretation of the Federal Constitution in Brown I is the
supreme law of the land, and cannot be evaded by the States. Id. at 18. Consequently, it affirmed the
appellate court's decision requiring prompt desegregation and reinstated the district court's enforcement
of the School Board's desegregation plan. Id. at 5.
220 Zelden, supra note 218, at 471.
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Board,22' that the Court actually said that its decision in Brown required
integration and had "teeth." It took two more decisions in 1969 and 1970,
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,222 and Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish School Board,223 to make it clear to the States that the Court
meant what it said when it came to desegregation and integration.224
Today, the Brown II "all deliberate speed" order is considered one of
the greatest failures of the Court during the civil rights era: "Both at the time
of the decision and in subsequent appraisals, Brown II was criticized for
delegating too much authority to the district courts and relying unduly on
state and local authorities., 225  In the face of a constitutional violation, the
Court bowed to state governments that did not want to desegregate, and
failed to create a timeframe that would counter the "massive resistance" to
226desegregation around the country. After all, if segregation was
unconstitutional, it did not follow that the Court would allow it to continue
for any time period. The "all deliberate speed" order diminished the
seriousness of the constitutional violation and allowed the state governments
leeway in their remedial efforts.
The Court must have known that its "all deliberate speed" order
would not force immediate state action. Politically, given the public opinion
of desegregation at the time, without a strong order from the Court, state
officials were savvy (and potentially motivated by animus) in their decision
221 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court held that the School Board's
"freedom-of-choice" program implemented in response to a prior Supreme Court ruling did not
adequately provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective integration of its schools and, as such,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection where the board had other more
immediate methods of achieving the required ends, including rezoning. Id. The Court's analysis relied
upon its rulings in prior school segregation cases addressing similar situations, leading it to conclude that
New Kent County's school board could more effectively integrate its students to immediately remedy the
disparities recognized as violating the guarantee of equal protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment
and must adopt measures to immediately effectuate unitary status among its schools. Id. at 437-39, 442.
222 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). In Alexander, the Court
considered the validity of an appellate court's order permitting Mississippi schools to operate a racially
segregated dual school system until it could transition to a unitary system. Id. at 20. The Court held that
the order was invalid. Id. It asserted that operating segregated schools under "a standard allowing 'all
deliberate speed' for desegregation" was no longer constitutional. Id. Desegregation, stated the Court,
must be enforced immediately, the dual school system giving way to a unitary one because children must
not be denied their fundamental rights. Id.
223 Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970). In Carter, the Court reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals which allowed school districts in Louisiana to defer pupil
desegregation beyond February 1970. Id. at 291. The Court held that the Court of Appeals misconstrued
the decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) by allowing such a
deferment. Id.
224 Zelden, supra note 217, at 486.
225 Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M. L. REV. 167, 182
(1997).
226 Id.
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to delay desegregation as long as possible.227 Additionally, given the large
cost of desegregating, busing students, and revising the entire educational
system of a state, the officials were constrained by considerations of
practicality.
The lesson that can be taken away from the Court's experiences with
desegregation is that in the face of a constitutional violation with racial
implications, the Court must provide language with "bite" to counteract the
strong political, practical, and structural obstacles to change. It is not enough
for the Court to recognize a law or policy that is constitutionally problematic;
in order to seriously catalyze change, the language of the Court must be
decisive and guiding.
D. "Likely... will examine ways
228
This is a lesson the Court did not heed in its decision in Bush v.
Gore.229 In Bush, the Court identified the variation in voting machines and
said that "[a]fter the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies
nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery
for voting. ,230 There is a strong parallel that can be made between this
language and the "all deliberate speed" order in Brown. Both orders provide
an ambiguous timeline for the States to cure a constitutional violation.
In Bush, the Court indicated, but did not hold, that the use of
disparate voting machines is unconstitutional, and the Court did not
immediately force the states to standardize.231 The Court's decision argued
that:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of
the franchise [to choose electors for the President of the United
States.] Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its
exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person's vote over that of another .... It must be remembered
that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.
232
227 d. at 186 (finding that politicians were unwilling to support desegregation and whites formed
groups in the South to actively oppose the process).
228 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 104, 104 (2000).
229 id.
230 Id.
231 Part In: "The Problem: Variations in Voting Technology," supra pp. 6.
232 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
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As described above, almost any reading of this language suggests that voting
machines with disparate error rates are unconstitutional. By counting a vote
on a machine that has a high error rate in comparison to other machines in
the state, a state dilutes the value of that person's vote, thus contradicting the
language of this passage. But the Court did not state outright that the States
needed to standardize their technology, rather it said the States "will . . .
likely" examine this issue.
Most likely, the Court was surprised by the vast amount of political
science data that was presented to them throughout the arguments and briefs
in Bush v. Gore on the variation of voting machines and its impact on
elections. Due to the fact that many of the statistical studies of voting
machines would be close to impossible without computers and a wide
network for sharing data across states, the nascent research in the area of
voting machines became more prominent in the months leading up to the
2000 election, and certainly immediately following the election. Thus, the
Court may not have considered voting technology as a potential equal
protection violation prior to its decision in Bush v. Gore. In Bush, had the
Court held outright that the use of varying voting machines was
unconstitutional, the already forming specter of illegitimacy over the
presidency in 2000 might have been too much for the country to handle. The
entire election system in every state would be invalid, and nationwide
challenges under the new doctrine might have forced another election. Like
the Court did almost fifty years earlier in Brown, the Court chose the
solidarity of a divided nation, and the practicalities of widespread change,
over a constitutional mandate that would have been difficult to implement
immediately.
Just as the decision in Brown, without a firm mandate, was a "shot
over the bow" to the states to begin the desegregation process, the language
implicating the voting machines in Bush indicated to the States that they
needed to thoroughly examine their voting machines. Just as the changes
after Brown were mired in state politics, funding issues, and left an impacted
class without substantial political influence with nowhere to turn but back to
the courts, changes to voting technology in the states have been slow, and the
states, burdened with large deficits, have struggled to meet the standards
recommended to them and those of HAVA. 33 If Brown is an indicator, the
Court will likely be forced to revisit the issues discussed in this article soon,
and in the face of a constitutional violation, the Court -should not tell the
233 Camp, supra note 36, at 443 (finding that "many states have failed to undertake ballot reform
efforts, and ... some have done so in an incomplete fashion"); see Dan Tokaji, What Voting Equipment
Will Ohio's 10 Largest Counties Be Using?, http:llmoritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part4/equipmenL
machines03.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) ("When the polls open on November 2, 2004, most Ohio
voters will find the same voting equipment that they used four years ago.").
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States to standardize machines with "all deliberate speed," rather it must
provide an ultimatum, mandating change prior to the next election.234
IX. Conclusion
John Hart Ely wrote, "[u]nblocking stoppages in the democratic
process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of
the vote seems the quintessential stoppage., 235 As technology advances, new
voting technologies will be utilized in American elections. Although these
new technologies provide for greater accuracy, faster voting, and quicker
results, as long as voting machinery is not standardized across a given State,
some voters will be left behind. There is significant evidence today that the
voters being left behind are disproportionately minorities in socio-
economically disadvantaged areas. When the right to vote is infringed, and
especially when that infringement has racial implications, the courts must
step in to protect the equal protection rights of those affected. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, "we have seen the eradication of numerical
malapportionment, the enfranchisement of minority voters, and the erosion
of discriminatory electoral systems. ,236 Nevertheless, although our electoral
processes have improved and become more inclusive over the last fifty years,
we can still do better. The closeness of the 2000 election and subsequent
studies of voting technology have "brought into sharp focus a common, if
heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon,, 237 resulting in an opportunity for the
Court to shape the law and institute change using its equal protection
jurisprudence. As we learned from Brown, in the face of a constitutional
violation, the Court must step in and not idly wait for the legislatures to act.
No matter what the cost, it is important that we commit the funds necessary
to protect the democratic ideals that we purport to advance. If Congress and
the legislatures will not, the Court must.
234 See Camp, supra note 36, at 443 (arguing that "the question of whether Bush itself mandates
reform will remain significant").
235 John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980). Even though we do not necessarily
want the Court getting involved in political issues, "[tihe party that controls the process has no incentive
to change it," and sometimes it is important for the Courts to step in. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
236 Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v.
Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 686 (1995).
237 Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
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TABLE 1: UNITED STATES VOTING TECHNOLOGIES238
EQUIPMENT F DESCRIPTION
Candidates' nam es are printed next to boxes which
voters mark, on large ballot forms that are counted
Paper Ballots manually. Because counting by hand is time
intensive, these remain in use mostly in small
_1 counties with few contested offices.
Each candidate name is assigned to a lever on a
rectangular array of levers on the face of the
Lever Machines machines. The voter pulls down selected levers to
indicate choices. Interlocks in the machines prevent
_ __ Iovervoting.
Information about the ballot choices is provided in a
booklet attached to a mechanical holder and
centered over a punch card, which is inserted by the
voter. To cast a vote, a stylus or other punching
device provided is used to punch holes at the
appropriate locations on the card, forcing out the
inside of a pre-scored area in the shape of a
rectangle.
In this variation on punch-card ballots, a stapler-
like tool creates holes on the card with sufficient
force that pre-scoring of ballot cards is unnecessary.
DataVote Unlike standard punch card systems, information on
candidates and ballot questions is printed directly
on the DataVote card, so it is easier for voters to
ascertain after completing their ballot whether they
voted as intended.
Large ballots similar to those of paper ballot
systems are used, allowing information about
Optical Scanning 239  candidates to be printed directly on the ballot.
Voters mark their choices using a pen or pencil.
Ballots are counted by a machine that uses light or
infra-red as a sensor to discern which oval or
238 Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Working Paper, Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential
Election: A County-Level Analysis 8 (May 2001), http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/invalidv.pdf.
239 A great deal of literature has discussed the differences between optical scan machines that
tabulate at the precinct-level and those that tabulate at a central location. Mebane, supra note 30, at 532.
230
RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE
rectangle the voter marked from a set of choices.
Some precinct-based scanning machines are





With electronic voting, voter choices directly enter
electronic storage, using touch screens, push buttons
or keyboards. Machines are typically programmed
to prevent overvoting. The most common models
are "full faced," showing all contests at once, like
lever machines, and a flashing red light alerts voters
to the contests in which they have not yet voted.
TABLE 2: RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VOTING
TECHNOLOGIES2'
240 Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 113, at 48.

